A Very Brief Introduction to Systemic Functional Grammar/Linguistics

When you're approaching any analysis of language, it’s usually necessary and useful to have a theoretical framework in mind. There are myriad theories of language, but one of the most important to contemporary linguistics is M.A.K. Halliday and Christian Matthiessen’s theory of Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG), which has contributed to the development of the linguistic subfield Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). Halliday and Matthiessen’s seminal work Introduction to Systemic Functional Grammar, first published in 1985 and now in its 4th edition, is notoriously dense and difficult to understand. This obscurity has prompted countless academics to attempt to explain SFG/L in their own (sometimes even more complex) words, in books, online college course resources, blog posts, and other formats. These sources are helpful and tend to reflect the subject accurately and concisely, but in this post I’m going to take a stab at illustrating (hopefully in less confusing terms) just a few aspects of it that are relevant to my project.

I’ll start with the name, which can seem a bit intimidating at first. The “systemic” part of SFG/L refers to the perspective that language is “a network of systems.” As the word “network” suggests, these systems are interconnected, and they each represent a set of choices for meaning making. Choice is probably the word that best captures the overall approach to language in SFG/L because, instead of treating actual instances of language use as variations on the rules of an a priori structure, SFG/L considers them as realizations of a system’s semiotic potential. This is where the “functional” part of the theory’s name comes in: describing a speaker/writer’s linguistic choices necessitates a view of language as a phenomenon performing a social function, rather than the traditional perspective that linguistic structures can be described in a vacuum, without considering context.

As Moses Ayoola explains, SFG “takes the resource perspective rather than the rule perspective,” merging structural linguistics with sociolinguistics and providing a useful framework for describing symbolic/linguistic interactions in society. SFG/L divides the semantic function of language into three distinct but simultaneous metafunctions (Ideational/Experiential, Interpersonal, Textual), each of which corresponds to a grammatical system (Process Type, Mood, Theme, respectively).

 

System Categories Organized by SFG Metafunction (Source)

Although the three metafunctions can be considered together - they are, after all, simultaneous and descriptive of language’s role in society - the Interpersonal metafunction is commonly used in isolation as an analytical framework in contemporary sociolinguistics because of its primary focus on describing certain highly relevant aspects of the ways in which information is exchanged among people and groups. Therefore, I have chosen to approach my own research on informal gender discourse using an Interpersonal metafunctional lens. Doing this allows me to describe the types of speech functions being utilized by the Twitter community, as well as the mood and modal commitment (certainty, enthusiasm, etc.) being reflected in their discussions on issues related to gender. In other words, this theoretical framework gives me the tools to understand and describe how the linguistic choices writers are making function within a certain context.

Hierarchy of Mood in SFG (Source)

What's In a Name?: The Problem with "Feminism"

The least binaristic representation of gender equality I could find. (Source)

As you've probably noticed, the "F-word" has quite the sordid reputation. "Feminism" can mean so many different things that the concept to which it refers is often misinterpreted, misrepresented, and misappropriated, to the detriment of all genders. Among contemporary feminists, the generally agreed upon definition of feminism  - quoted so eloquently by Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie in her book and her TEDx Talk - is the belief in "the social, political, and economic equality of the [genders]” (I've replaced “sexes” with “genders” to align my work with theories distinguishing between the two). The popular perception of feminism, however, ranges from minor confusion to downright ignorance: that feminists hate men, that we think we are better than men, that we willfully ignore intersectional concerns, and even that gender equality should no longer be an issue because it has supposedly been achieved, are all allegations that stem not only from mislabeling certain people (like those who unequivocally hate all men) as feminists, but also from a misconception of feminism itself.

Clearly this is just one of many cases in which the connotative and denotative meanings of a word are so disconnected that they indicate the need for serious reassessment of certain aspects of our language. I propose that the backlash against feminism is partially a function of the word "feminism" itself: it not only excludes genders other than feminine, it also represents the concept as monolithic, as if all feminists and non-feminists agree on a single definition (which they clearly don't) and as if it has always meant the same thing. Arguments against this idea are varied, coming from feminists and non-feminists alike, although there are definitely proponents on both sides as well (as evidenced by this Debate.org page).

One of the main arguments against my position (found in articles like these) is that changing the word will do little to assuage the resistance against gender equality, that the word we use is irrelevant when confronting a population in denial about the persistent systemic and institutional gender inequality historically entrenched in some of "Western" culture's most basic values and assumptions. Aside from the disturbing pessimism inherent in this argument, it also makes little sense from a contemporary sociolinguistic perspective. Another argument is that using umbrella terms (like gender equality or equalism) further marginalizes already marginalized groups, like women, and focuses attention only on the dominant population. I'd respond (with just one of the many possible counter-arguments) that reactionary ideologies like men's rights activism, which has been steadily gaining traction (much to the dismay of people who actually understand gender issues), do even more to marginalize, silence, and erase non-dominant groups than an inclusive, catch-all term would.

Suffice it to say that this is an issue that requires more redress than space currently permits. The "F-word" creates more barriers than it opens opportunities for frank, productive conversations about gender issues. It is practically as alienating as that other ubiquitous f-word, and alienation is the exact opposite of what feminism is supposed to be promoting. This is by no means an original or unique position; I would simply like to examine this issue from a more analytical and theoretically-grounded perspective than I see public intellectuals engaging with.